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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The biological immune system is a robust, complex, adaptive system that 
defends the body from foreign pathogens. It is able to categorize all cells (or 
molecules) within the body as self-cells or non-self cells. It does this with 
the help of a distributed task force that has the intelligence to take action 
from a local and also a global perspective using its network of chemical 
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messengers for communication. There are two major branches of the 
immune system. The innate immune system is an unchanging mechanism 
that detects and destroys certain invading organisms, whilst the adaptive 
immune system responds to previously unknown foreign cells and builds a 
response to them that can remain in the body over a long period of time. This 
remarkable information processing biological system has caught the 
attention of computer science in recent years.  
 
A novel computational intelligence technique, inspired by immunology, 
has emerged, called Artificial Immune Systems. Several concepts from the 
immune have been extracted and applied for solution to real world science 
and engineering problems. In this tutorial, we briefly describe the immune 
system metaphors that are relevant to existing Artificial Immune Systems 
methods. We will then show illustrative real-world problems suitable for 
Artificial Immune Systems and give a step-by-step algorithm walkthrough 
for one such problem. A comparison of the Artificial Immune Systems to 
other well-known algorithms, areas for future work, tips & tricks and a list 
of resources will round this tutorial off. It should be noted that as Artificial 
Immune Systems is still a young and evolving field, there is not yet a fixed 
algorithm template and hence actual implementations might differ somewhat 
from time to time and from those examples given here. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE BIOLOGICAL IMMUNE 
SYSTEM 
 
The biological immune system is an elaborate defense system which has 
evolved over millions of years.  While many details of the immune 
mechanisms (innate and adaptive) and processes (humeral and cellular) are 
yet unknown (even to immunologists), it is, however, well-known that the 
immune system uses multilevel (and overlapping) defense both in parallel 
and sequential fashion. Depending on the type of the pathogen, and the way 
it gets into the body, the immune system uses different response mechanisms 
(differential pathways) either to neutralize the pathogenic effect or to destroy 
the infected cells.  A detailed overview of the immune system can be found 
in many textbooks, for instance Kubi (2002). The immune features that are 
particularly relevant to our tutorial are matching, diversity and distributed 
control. Matching refers to the binding between antibodies and antigens. 
Diversity refers to the fact that, in order to achieve optimal antigen space 
coverage, antibody diversity must be encouraged according to Hightower et 
al (1995). Distributed control means that there is no central controller; 
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rather, the immune system is governed by local interactions among immune 
cells and antigens. 
Two of the most important-cells in this process are white blood cells, 
called T-cells, and B-cells. Both of these originate in the bone marrow, but 
T-cells pass on to the thymus to mature, before they circulate the body in the 
blood and lymphatic vessels. 
 
The T-cells are of three types; T helper cells which are essential to the 
activation of B-cells, Killer T-cells which bind to foreign invaders and inject 
poisonous chemicals into them causing their destruction, and suppressor T-
cells which inhibit the action of other immune cells thus preventing allergic 
reactions and autoimmune diseases. 
 
B-cells are responsible for the production and secretion of antibodies, 
which are specific proteins that bind to the antigen. Each B-cell can only 
produce one particular antibody. The antigen is found on the surface of the 
invading organism and the binding of an antibody to the antigen is a signal 
to destroy the invading cell as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure -1. Pictorial representation of the essence of the acquired immune system mechanism 
(taken from de Castro and van Zuben (1999): I-II show the invade entering the body and 
activating T-Cells, which then in IV activate the B-cells, V is the antigen matching, VI the 
antibody production and VII the antigen’s destruction. 
 
 As mentioned above, the human body is protected against foreign 
invaders by a multi-layered system. The immune system is composed of 
physical barriers such as the skin and respiratory system; physiological 
barriers such as destructive enzymes and stomach acids; and the immune 
system, which has can be broadly divided under two heads – Innate (non-
specific) Immunity and Adaptive (specific) Immunity, which are inter-linked 
and influence each other. The Adaptive Immunity again is subdivided under 
two heads – Humoral Immunity and Cell Mediated Immunity. 
 
Innate Immunity: The Innate Immunity is present at birth. Physiological 
conditions such as pH, temperature and chemical mediators provide 
inappropriate living conditions for foreign organisms. Also microorganisms 
are coated with antibodies and/or complement products (opsonization) so 
that they are easily recognized. Extracellular material is then ingested by 
macrophages by a process called phagocytosis. Also TDH Cells influences 
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the phagocytosis of macrophages by secreting certain chemical messengers 
called lymphokines. The low levels of sialic acid on foreign antigenic 
surfaces make C3b bind to these surfaces for a long time and thus activate 
alternative pathways. Thus MAC is formed, which puncture the cell surfaces 
and kill the foreign invader.  
 
Adaptive Immunity: Adaptive Immunity is the main focus of interest 
here as learning, adaptability, and memory are important characteristics of 
Adaptive Immunity. It is subdivided under two heads – Humoral Immunity 
and Cell Mediated Immunity. 
 
Humoral immunity: Humoral immunity is mediated by antibodies 
contained in body fluids (known as humors). The humoral branch of the 
immune system involves interaction of B cells with antigen and their 
subsequent proliferation and differentiation into antibody-secreting plasma 
cells. Antibody functions as the effectors of the humoral response by binding 
to antigen and facilitating its elimination. When an antigen is coated with 
antibody, it can be eliminated in several ways. For example, antibody can 
cross-link the antigen, forming clusters that are more readily ingested by 
phagocytic cells. Binding of antibody to antigen on a microorganism also 
can activate the complement system, resulting in lysis of the foreign 
organism. 
 
Cellular immunity: Cellular immunity is cell-mediated; effector T cells 
generated in response to antigen are responsible for cell-mediated immunity. 
Cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) participate in cell-mediated immune 
reactions by killing altered self-cells; they play an important role in the 
killing of virus-infected cells and tumor cells. Cytokines secreted by TDH can 
mediate the cellular immunity, and activate various phagocytic cells, 
enabling them to phagocytose and kill microorganisms more effectively. 
This type of cell-mediated immune response is especially important in host 
defense against intracellular bacteria and protozoa. 
 
Whilst there is more than one mechanism at work (see Farmer (1986), 
Kubi (2002) or Jerne (1973) for more details), the essential process is the 
matching of antigen and antibody, which leads to increased concentrations 
(proliferation) of more closely matched antibodies. In particular, idiotypic 
network theory, negative selection mechanism, and the ‘clonal selection’ and 
‘somatic hypermutation’ theories are primarily used in Artificial Immune 
Systems models. 
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2.1 Immune Network Theory 
The immune Network theory had been proposed in the mid-seventies 
(Jerne 1974). The hypothesis was that the immune system maintains an 
idiotypic network of interconnected B cells for antigen recognition. These 
cells both stimulate and suppress each other in certain ways that lead to the 
stabilization of the network. Two B cells are connected if the affinities they 
share exceed a certain threshold, and the strength of the connection is 
directly proportional to the affinity they share. 
 
2.2 Negative Selection mechanism 
The purpose of negative selection is to provide tolerance for self cells. It 
deals with the immune system's ability to detect unknown antigens while not 
reacting to the self cells. During the generation of T-cells, receptors are 
made through a pseudo-random genetic rearrangement process. Then, they 
undergo a censoring process in the thymus, called the negative selection. 
There, T-cells that react against self-proteins are destroyed; thus, only those 
that do not bind to self-proteins are allowed to leave the thymus. These 
matured T-cells then circulate throughout the body to perform 
immunological functions and protect the body against foreign antigens. 
 
2.3 Clonal Selection Principle 
The clonal selection principle describes the basic features of an immune 
response to an antigenic stimulus. It establishes the idea that only those cells 
that recognize the antigen proliferate, thus being selected against those that 
do not. The main features of the clonal selection theory are that: 
• The new cells are copies of their parents (clone) subjected to a mutation 
mechanism with high rates (somatic hypermutation); 
• Elimination of newly differentiated lymphocytes carrying self-reactive 
receptors; 
• Proliferation and differentiation on contact of mature cells with 
antigens. 
 
When an antibody strongly matches an antigen the corresponding B-cell 
is stimulated to produce clones of itself that then produce more antibodies. 
This (hyper) mutation, is quite rapid, often as much as “one mutation per cell 
division” (de Castro and Von Zuben, 1999). This allows a very quick 
response to the antigens.  It should be noted here that in the Artificial 
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Immune Systems literature, often no distinction is made between B-cells and 
the antibodies they produce. Both are subsumed under the word ‘antibody’ 
and statements such as mutation of antibodies (rather than mutation of B-
cells) are common.  
 
There are many more features of the immune system, including 
adaptation, immunological memory and protection against auto-immune 
attacks, not discussed here. In the following sections, we will revisit some 
important aspects of these concepts and show how they can be modelled in 
‘artificial’ immune systems and then used to solve real-world problems. 
First, let us give an overview of typical problems that we believe are 
amenable to being solved by Artificial Immune Systems. 
3. ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEMS 
3.1 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Anyone keeping up-to-date with current affairs in computing can confirm 
numerous cases of attacks made on computer servers of well-known 
companies. These attacks range from denial-of-service attacks to extracting 
credit-card details and sometimes we find ourselves thinking “haven’t they 
installed a firewall”? The fact is they often have a firewall. A firewall is a 
useful, often essential, but current firewall technology is insufficient to 
detect and block all kinds of attacks. 
 
However, on ports that need to be open to the internet, a firewall can do 
little to prevent attacks. Moreover, even if a port is blocked from internet 
access, this does not stop an attack from inside the organisation. This is 
where Intrusion Detection Systems come in. As the name suggests, Intrusion 
Detection Systems are installed to identify (potential) attacks and to react by 
usually generating an alert or blocking the unscrupulous data. 
 
The main goal of Intrusion Detection Systems is to detect unauthorised 
use, misuse and abuse of computer systems by both system insiders and 
external intruders. Most current Intrusion Detection Systems define 
suspicious signatures based on known intrusions and probes. The obvious 
limit of this type of Intrusion Detection Systems is its failure of detecting 
previously unknown intrusions. In contrast, the human immune system 
adaptively generates new immune cells so that it is able to detect previously 
unknown and rapidly evolving harmful antigens (Forrest et al 1994). Thus 
the challenge is to emulate the success of the natural systems. 
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3.2 Data Mining – Collaborative Filtering and 
Clustering 
Collaborative Filtering is the term for a broad range of algorithms that 
use similarity measures to obtain recommendations. The best-known 
example is probably the “people who bought this also bought” feature of the 
internet company Amazon (2003). However, any problem domain where 
users are required to rate items is amenable to Collaborative Filtering 
techniques. Commercial applications are usually called recommender 
systems (Resnick and Varian 1997). A canonical example is movie 
recommendation. 
 
In traditional Collaborative Filtering, the items to be recommended are 
treated as ‘black boxes’. That is, your recommendations are based purely on 
the votes of other users, and not on the content of the item. The preferences 
of a user, usually a set of votes on an item, comprise a user profile, and these 
profiles are compared in order to build a neighbourhood. The key decision is 
what similarity measure is used: The most common method to compare two 
users is a correlation-based measure like Pearson or Spearman, which gives 
two neighbours a matching score between -1 and 1. The canonical example 
is the k-Nearest-Neighbour algorithm, which uses a matching method to 
select k reviewers with high similarity measures. The votes from these 
reviewers, suitably weighted, are used to make predictions and 
recommendations. 
 
The evaluation of a Collaborative Filtering algorithm usually centres on 
its accuracy. There is a difference between prediction (given a movie, 
predict a given user’s rating of that movie) and recommendation (given a 
user, suggest movies that are likely to attract a high rating). Prediction is 
easier to assess quantitatively but recommendation is a more natural fit to the 
movie domain. A related problem to Collaborative Filtering is that of 
clustering data or users in a database. This is particularly useful in very large 
databases, which have become too large to handle. Clustering works by 
dividing the entries of the database into groups, which contain people with 
similar preferences or in general data of similar type. 
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4. ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEMS BASIC 
CONCEPTS 
4.1 Initialisation / Encoding 
To implement a basic Artificial Immune System, four decisions have to 
be made: Encoding, Similarity Measure, Selection and Mutation. Once an 
encoding has been fixed and a suitable similarity measure is chosen, the 
algorithm will then perform selection and mutation, both based on the 
similarity measure, until stopping criteria are met. In this section, we will 
describe each of these components in turn. 
 
Along with other heuristics, choosing a suitable encoding is very 
important for the algorithm’s success. Similar to Genetic Algorithms, there 
is close inter-play between the encoding and the fitness function (the later is 
in Artificial Immune Systems referred to as the ‘matching’ or ‘affinity’ 
function). Hence both ought to be thought about at the same time. For the 
current discussion, let us start with the encoding. 
 
First, let us define what we mean by ‘antigen’ and ‘antibody’ in the 
context of an application domain. Typically, an antigen is the target or 
solution, e.g. the data item we need to check to see if it is an intrusion, or the 
user that we need to cluster or make a recommendation for. The antibodies 
are the remainder of the data, e.g. other users in the data base, a set of 
network traffic that has already been identified etc. Sometimes, there can be 
more than one antigen at a time and there are usually a large number of 
antibodies present simultaneously. 
 
Antigens and antibodies are represented or encoded in the same way. For 
most problems the most obvious representation is a string of numbers or 
features, where the length is the number of variables, the position is the 
variable identifier and the value (could be binary or real) of the variable. For 
instance, in a five variable binary problem, an encoding could look like this: 
(10010). 
 
As mentioned previously, for data mining and intrusion detection 
applications. What would an encoding look like in these cases? For data 
mining, let us consider the problem of recommending movies. Here the 
encoding has to represent a user’s profile with regards to the movies he has 
seen and how much he has (dis)liked them. A possible encoding for this 
could be a list of numbers, where each number represents the 'vote' for an 
item. Votes could be binary (e.g. Did you visit this web page?), but can also 
 10 
be integers in a range (say [0, 5], i.e. 0 - did not like the movie at all, 5 – did 
like the movie very much). 
 
Hence for the movie recommendation, a possible encoding is: 
{ } { } { }{ }nn scoreidscoreidscoreidUser ,...,,, 2211=  
Where id corresponds to the unique identifier of the movie being rated 
and score to this user’s score for that movie. This captures the essential 
features of the data available (Cayzer and Aickelin 2002). 
 
For intrusion detection, the encoding may be to encapsulate the essence 
of each data packet transferred, e.g. [<protocol> <source ip> <source port> 
<destination ip> <destination port>], example: [<tcp> <113.112.255.254> 
<108.200.111.12> <25> which represents an incoming data packet send to 
port 25. In these scenarios, wildcards like ‘any port’ are also often used. 
 
4.2 Similarity or Affinity Measure 
As mentioned in the previous section, similarity measure or matching 
rule is one of the most important design choices in developing an Artificial 
Immune Systems algorithm, and is closely coupled to the encoding scheme. 
 
Two of the simplest matching algorithms are best explained using binary 
encoding: Consider the strings (00000) and (00011). If one does a bit-by-bit 
comparison, the first three bits are identical and hence we could give this 
pair a matching score of 3. In other words, we compute the opposite of the 
Hamming Distance (which is defined as the number of bits that have to be 
changed in order to make the two strings identical). 
 
Now consider this pair: (00000) and (01010). Again, simple bit matching 
gives us a similarity score of 3. However, the matching is quite different as 
the three matching bits are not connected. Depending on the problem and 
encoding, this might be better or worse. Thus, another simple matching 
algorithm is to count the number of continuous bits that match and return the 
length of the longest matching as the similarity measure. For the first 
example above this would still be 3, for the second example this would be 1. 
 
If the encoding is non-binary, e.g. real variables, there are even more 
possibilities to compute the ‘distance’ between the two strings, for instance 
we could compute the geometrical (Euclidian) distance etc. 
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For data mining problems, like the movie recommendation system, 
similarity often means ‘correlation’. Take the movie recommendation 
problem as an example and assume that we are trying to find users in a 
database that are similar to the key user who’s profile were are trying to 
match in order to make recommendations. In this case, what we are trying to 
measure is how similar are the two users’ tastes. One of the easiest ways of 
doing this is to compute the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the two 
users. 
 
I.e. if the Pearson measure is used to compare two user’s u and v: 
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Where u and v are users, n is the number of overlapping votes (i.e. 
Movies for which both u and v have voted), ui is the vote of user u for movie 
i and ū is the average vote of user u over all films (not just the overlapping 
votes). The measure is amended so default to a value of 0 if the two users 
have no films in common. During our research reported in Cayzer and 
Aickelin (2002a, 2002b) we also found it useful to introduce a penalty 
parameter (c.f. penalties in genetic algorithms) for users who only have very 
few films in common, which in essence reduces their correlation. 
 
The outcome of this measure is a value between -1 and 1, where values 
close to 1 mean strong agreement, values near to -1 mean strong 
disagreement and values around 0 mean no correlation. From a data mining 
point of view, those users who score either 1 or -1 are the most useful and 
hence will be selected for further treatment by the algorithm. 
 
For other applications, ‘matching’ might not actually be beneficial and 
hence those items that match might be eliminated. This approach is known 
as ‘negative selection’ and mirrors what is believed to happen during the 
maturation of B-cells who have to learn not to ‘match’ our own tissues as 
otherwise we would be subject to auto-immune diseases. 
 
Under what circumstance would a negative selection algorithm be 
suitable for an Artificial Immune Systems implementation? Consider the 
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case of Intrusion Detection as solved by Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000). One 
way of solving this problem is by defining a set of ‘self’, i.e. a trusted 
network, our company’s computers, known partners etc. During the 
initialisation of the algorithm, we would then randomly create a large 
number of so called ‘detectors’, i.e. strings that looks similar to the sample 
Intrusion Detection Systems encoding given above. We would then subject 
these detectors to a matching algorithm that compares them to our ‘self’. 
Any matching detector would be eliminated and hence we select those that 
do no match (negative selection). All non-matching detectors will then form 
our final detector set. This detector set is then used in the second phase of 
the algorithm to continuously monitor all network traffic. Should a match be 
found now the algorithm would report this as a possible alert or ‘non-self’. 
There are a number of problems with this approach, which we shall discuss 
further in the Enhancements and Future Application Section. 
 
4.3 Negative, Clonal or Neighbourhood Selection 
The meaning of this step differs somewhat depending on the exact 
problem the Artificial Immune Systems is applied to. We have already 
described the concept of negative selection above. For the film 
recommender, choosing a suitable neighbourhood means choosing good 
correlation scores and hence we will perform ‘positive’ selection. How 
would the algorithm use this? 
 
Consider the Artificial Immune Systems to be empty at the beginning. 
The target user is encoded as the antigen, and all other users in the database 
are possible antibodies. We add the antigen to the Artificial Immune 
Systems and then we add one candidate antibody at a time. Antibodies will 
start with a certain concentration value. This value is decreasing over time 
(death rate), similar to the evaporation in Ant Systems. Antibodies with a 
sufficiently low concentration are removed from the system, whereas 
antibodies with a high concentration may saturate. However, an antibody can 
increase its concentration by matching the antigen, the better the match the 
higher the increase (a process called ‘stimulation’). The process of 
stimulation or increasing concentration can also be regarded as ‘cloning’ if 
one thinks in a discrete setting. Once enough antibodies have been added to 
the system, it starts to iterate a loop of reducing concentration and 
stimulation until at least one antibody drops out. A new antibody is added 
and the process repeated until the Artificial Immune Systems is stabilised, 
i.e. there are no more drop-outs for a certain period of time. 
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Mathematically, at each step (iteration) an antibody’s concentration is 
increased by an amount dependent on its matching to each antigen. In 
absence of matching, an antibody’s concentration will slowly decrease over 
time. Hence an Artificial Immune Systems iteration is governed by the 
following equation, based on Farmer et al (1986): 
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Where: 
N is the number of antigens. 
xi is the concentration of antibody i 
yj is the concentration of antigen j 
k2 is the stimulation effect and k3 is the death rate 
mji is the matching function between antibody i & antibody (or antigen) j 
 
The following pseudo code summarise the Artificial Immune Systems of 
the movie recommender: 
 
Initialise Artificial Immune Systems 
Encode user for whom to make predictions as antigen Ag 
WHILE (Artificial Immune Systems not Full) & (More Antibodies) DO 
 Add next user as an antibody Ab 
 Calculate matching scores between Ab and Ag 
 WHILE (Artificial Immune Systems at full size) & (Artificial 
Immune Systems not Stabilised) DO 
  Reduce Concentration of all Abs by a fixed amount 
  Match each Ab against Ag and stimulate as necessary 
 OD 
OD 
Use final set of Antibodies to produce recommendation. 
 
In this example, the Artificial Immune Systems is considered stable after 
iterating for ten iterations without changing in size. Stabilisation thus means 
that a sufficient number of ‘good’ neighbours have been identified and 
therefore a prediction can be made. ‘Poor’ neighbours would be expected to 
drop out of the Artificial Immune Systems after a few iterations. Once the 
Artificial Immune Systems has stabilised using the above algorithm, we use 
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the antibody concentration to weigh the neighbours and then perform a 
weighted average type recommendation. 
 
4.4 Somatic Hypermutation 
The mutation most commonly used in Artificial Immune Systems is very 
similar to that found in Genetic Algorithms, e.g. for binary strings bits are 
flipped, for real value strings one value is changed at random, or for others 
the order of elements is swapped. In addition, the mechanism is often 
enhanced by the ‘somatic’ idea, i.e. the closer the match (or the less close the 
match, depending on what we are trying to achieve), the more (or less) 
disruptive the mutation. 
 
However, mutating the data might not make sense for all problems 
considered. For instance, it would not be suitable for the movie 
recommender. Certainly, mutation could be used to make users more similar 
to the target, however, the validity of recommendations based on these 
artificial users is questionable and if over-done, we would end up with the 
target user itself. Hence for some problems, somatic Hypermutation is not 
used, since it is not immediately obvious how to mutate the data sensibly 
such that these artificial entities still represent plausible data. 
 
Nevertheless, for other problem domains, mutation might be very useful. 
For instance, taking the negative selection approach to intrusion detection, 
rather than throwing away matching detectors in the first phase of the 
algorithm, these could be mutated to safe time and effort. Also, depending 
on the degree of matching the mutation could e more or less strong. This was 
in fact one extension implemented by Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000). 
 
For data mining problems, mutation might also be useful, if for instance 
the aim is to cluster users. Then the centre of each cluster (the antibodies) 
could be an artificial pseudo user that can be mutated at will until the desired 
degree of matching between the centre and antigens in its cluster is reached. 
This is an approach implemented by Castro and von Zuben (2001).  
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5. COMPARISON OF ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE 
SYSTEMS TO GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND 
NEURAL NETWORKS 
Going through the tutorial so far, you might already have noticed that 
both Genetic Algorithms and Neural Networks have been mentioned a 
number of times. In fact, they both have a number of ideas in common with 
Artificial Immune Systems and the purpose of the following, self-
explanatory table, is to put their similarities and differences next to each 
other (see Dasgupta 1999). Evolutionary computation shares many elements, 
concepts like population, genotype phenotype mapping, and proliferation of 
the most fitted are present in different Artificial Immune Systems methods.  
 
Artificial Immune Systems models based on immune networks resembles 
the structures and interactions of connectionist models. Some works have 
pointed out the similarities and the differences between Artificial Immune 
Systems and artificial neural networks (Dasgupta 1999 and De Castro and 
Von Zuben 2001). De Castro has also used Artificial Immune Systems to 
initialize the centres of radial basis function neural networks and to produce 
a good initial set of weights for feed-forward neural networks. 
 
It should be noted that some of the items in table 1 are gross 
simplifications, both to benefit the design of the table and not to overwhelm 
the reader. Some of these points are debatable; however, we believe that this 
comparison is valuable nevertheless to show exactly where Artificial 
Immune Systems fit in. The comparisons are based on a Genetic Algorithm 
(GA) used for optimisation and a Neural Network (NN) used for 
Classification. 
 
  GA 
(Optimisation) 
NN 
(Classification) 
Artificial Immune 
Systems 
Components Chromosome 
Strings 
Artificial 
Neurons 
Attribute Strings 
Location of 
Components 
Dynamic Pre-Defined Dynamic 
Structure Discrete 
Components 
Networked 
Components 
Discrete 
components / 
Networked 
Components 
Knowledge 
Storage 
Chromosome 
Strings 
Connection 
Strengths 
Component 
Concentration / 
Network 
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Connections 
Dynamics Evolution Learning Evolution / 
Learning 
Meta-
Dynamics 
Recruitment / 
Elimination of 
Components 
Construction / 
Pruning of 
Connections 
Recruitment / 
Elimination of 
Components 
Interaction 
between 
Components 
Crossover Network 
Connections 
Recognition / 
Network 
Connections 
Interaction 
with 
Environment 
Fitness Function External Stimuli Recognition / 
Objective 
Function 
Threshold 
Activity 
Crowding / 
Sharing 
Neuron 
Activation 
Component 
Affinity 
Table 1: Comparison of Artificial Immune Systems to Genetic 
Algorithms and Neural Networks. 
 
 
6. EXTENSIONS OF ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE 
SYSTEMS 
6.1 Idiotypic Networks - Network Interactions 
(Suppression) 
The idiotypic effect builds on the premise that antibodies can match other 
antibodies as well as antigens. It was first proposed by Jerne (1973) and 
formalised into a model by Farmer et al (1986). The theory is currently 
debated by immunologists, with no clear consensus yet on its effects in the 
humoral immune system (Kuby 2002). The idiotypic network hypothesis 
builds on the recognition that antibodies can match other antibodies as well 
as antigens. Hence, an antibody may be matched by other antibodies, which 
in turn may be matched by yet other antibodies. This activation can continue 
to spread through the population and potentially has much explanatory 
power. It could, for example, help explain how the memory of past 
infections is maintained. Furthermore, it could result in the suppression of 
similar antibodies thus encouraging diversity in the antibody pool. The 
idiotypic network has been formalised by a number of theoretical 
immunologists (Perelson and Weisbuch 1997): 
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Where: 
N is the number of antibodies and n is the number of antigens. 
xi (or xi) is the concentration of antibody i (or j) 
yi is the concentration of antigen j 
c is a rate constant 
k1 is a suppressive effect and k2 is the death rate 
mji is the matching function between antibody i & antibody (or antigen) j 
 
As can be seen from the above equation, the nature of an idiotypic 
interaction can be either positive or negative. Moreover, if the matching 
function is symmetric, then the balance between “I am recognised” and 
“Antibodies recognised” (parameters c and k1 in the equation) wholly 
determines whether the idiotypic effect is positive or negative, and we can 
simplify the equation. We can simplify equation (1) above still if we only 
allow one antigen in the Artificial Immune Systems. In the new equation (2), 
the first term is simplified as we only have one antigen, and the suppression 
term is normalised to allow a ‘like for like’ comparison between the different 
rate constants. The simplified equation looks like this: 
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Where: 
k1 is stimulation, k2 suppression and k3  death rate 
mi is the correlation between antibody i and the (sole) antigen 
xi (or xi) is the concentration of antibody i (or j) 
y is the concentration of the (sole) antigen 
mij is the correlation between antibodies i and j 
n is the number of antibodies. 
 
Why would we want to use the idotypic effect? Because it might provide 
us with a way of achieving ‘diversity’, similar to ‘crowding’ or ‘fitness 
sharing’ in a genetic algorithm. For instance, in the movie recommender, we 
want to ensure that the final neighbourhood population is diverse, so that we 
get more interesting recommendations. Hence, to use the idiotypic effect in 
the movie recommender system mentioned previously, the pseudo code 
would be amended by adding the following lines in italic. 
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Initialise Artificial Immune Systems 
Encode user for whom to make predictions as antigen Ag 
WHILE (Artificial Immune Systems not Full) & (More Antibodies) DO 
   Add next user as an antibody Ab 
    Calculate matching scores between Ab and Ag and Ab and other Abs 
 WHILE (Artificial Immune Systems at full size) & (Artificial 
Immune Systems not Stabilised) DO 
      Reduce Concentration of all Abs by a fixed amount 
      Match each Ab against Ag and stimulate as necessary 
      Match each Ab against each other Ab and execute idiotypic effect 
 OD 
OD 
Use final set of Antibodies to produce recommendation. 
 
The diagrams in figure 3 below show the idiotypic effect using dotted 
arrows whereas standard stimulation is shown using black arrows. In the left 
diagram antibodies Ab1 and Ab3 are very similar and they would have their 
concentrations reduced in the ’Iterate Artificial Immune Systems’ stage of 
the algorithm above. However, in the right diagram, the four antibodies are 
well separated from each other as well as being close to the antigen and so 
would have their concentrations increased. 
 
At each iteration of the film recommendation Artificial Immune Systems 
the concentration of the antibodies is changed according to the formula 
given on the next page. This will increase the concentration of antibodies 
that are similar to the antigen and can allow either the stimulation, 
suppression, or both, of antibody-antibody interactions to have an effect on 
the antibody concentration. More detailed discussion of these effects on 
recommendation problems are contained within Cayzer and Aickelin (2002a 
and 2002b). 
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Figure -2. Illustration of the idiotypic effect 
 
6.2 Danger Theory 
Over the last decade, a new theory has become popular amongst 
immunologists. It is called the Danger Theory, and its chief advocate is 
Matzinger (1994, 2001 and 2003). A number of advantages are claimed for 
this theory; not least that it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune 
response. The theory is not complete, and there are some doubts about how 
much it actually changes behaviour and / or structure. Nevertheless, the 
theory contains enough potentially interesting ideas to make it worth 
assessing its relevance to Artificial Immune Systems. 
 
However, it is not simply a question of matching in the humoral immune 
system. It is fundamental that only the ‘correct’ cells are matched as 
otherwise this could lead to a self-destructive autoimmune reaction. 
Classical immunology (Kuby 2002) stipulates that an immune response is 
triggered when the body encounters something non-self or foreign. It is not 
yet fully understood how this self-non-self discrimination is achieved, but 
many immunologists believe that the difference between them is learnt early 
in life. In particular it is thought that the maturation process plays an 
important role to achieve self-tolerance by eliminating those T and B-cells 
that react to self. In addition, a ‘confirmation’ signal is required; that is, for 
either B-cell or T (killer) cell activation, a T (helper) lymphocyte must also 
be activated. This dual activation is further protection against the chance of 
accidentally reacting to self. 
 
Ab3 
Ab2 
Ab1 
AG 
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Matzinger’s Danger Theory debates this point of view (for a good 
introduction, see Matzinger 2003). Technical overviews can be found in 
Matzinger (1994) and Matzinger (2001). She points out that there must be 
discrimination happening that goes beyond the self-non-self distinction 
described above. For instance: 
• There is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the gut or to the food 
we eat although both are foreign entities. 
• Conversely, some auto-reactive processes are useful, for example against 
self molecules expressed by stressed cells. 
• The definition of self is problematic – realistically, self is confined to the 
subset actually seen by the lymphocytes during maturation. 
• The human body changes over its lifetime and thus self changes as well. 
Therefore, the question arises whether defences against non-self learned 
early in life might be autoreactive later. 
 
Other aspects that seem to be at odds with the traditional viewpoint are 
autoimmune diseases and certain types of tumours that are fought by the 
immune system (both attacks against self) and successful transplants (no 
attack against non-self). 
 
Matzinger concludes that the immune system actually discriminates 
“some self from some non-self”. She asserts that the Danger Theory 
introduces not just new labels, but a way of escaping the semantic 
difficulties with self and non-self, and thus provides grounding for the 
immune response. If we accept the Danger Theory as valid we can take care 
of ‘non-self but harmless’ and of ‘self but harmful’ invaders into our system. 
To see how this is possible, we will have to examine the theory in more 
detail. 
 
The central idea in the Danger Theory is that the immune system does 
not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus, just like the self-non-self 
theories, it fundamentally supports the need for discrimination. However, it 
differs in the answer to what should be responded to. Instead of responding 
to foreignness, the immune system reacts to danger. This theory is borne out 
of the observation that there is no need to attack everything that is foreign, 
something that seems to be supported by the counter examples above. In this 
theory, danger is measured by damage to cells indicated by distress signals 
that are sent out when cells die an unnatural death (cell stress or lytic cell 
death, as opposed to programmed cell death, or apoptosis). 
 
Figure 4 depicts how we might picture an immune response according to 
the Danger Theory (Aickelin and Cayzer (2002)). A cell that is in distress 
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sends out an alarm signal, where upon antigens in the neighbourhood are 
captured by antigen-presenting cells such as macrophages, which then travel 
to the local lymph node and present the antigens to lymphocytes. Essentially, 
the danger signal establishes a danger zone around itself. Thus B-cells 
producing antibodies that match antigens within the danger zone get 
stimulated and undergo the clonal expansion process. Those that do not 
match or are too far away do not get stimulated.  
 
Antigens 
Antibodies 
Match, but 
too far 
away 
Stimulation 
Danger 
Zone 
Danger Signal 
Damaged Cell 
Cells 
No match 
 
Figure -4. Danger Theory Illustration 
 
 
Matzinger admits that the exact nature of the danger signal is unclear. It 
may be a ‘positive’ signal (for example heat shock protein release) or a 
‘negative’ signal (for example lack of synaptic contact with a dendritic 
antigen-presenting cell). This is where the Danger Theory shares some of the 
problems associated with traditional self-non-self discrimination (i.e. how to 
discriminate danger from non-danger). However, in this case, the signal is 
grounded rather than being some abstract representation of danger. 
 
How could we use the Danger Theory in Artificial Immune Systems? 
The Danger Theory is not about the way Artificial Immune Systems 
represent data (Aickelin and Cayzer 2002). Instead, it provides ideas about 
which data the Artificial Immune Systems should represent and deal with. 
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They should focus on dangerous, i.e. interesting data. It could be argued that 
the shift from non-self to danger is merely a symbolic label change that 
achieves nothing. We do not believe this to be the case, since danger is a 
grounded signal, and non-self is (typically) a set of feature vectors with no 
further information about whether all or some of these features are required 
over time. The danger signal helps us to identify which subset of feature 
vectors is of interest. A suitably defined danger signal thus overcomes many 
of the limitations of self-non-self selection. It restricts the domain of non-self 
to a manageable size, removes the need to screen against all self, and deals 
adaptively with scenarios where self (or non-self) changes over time. 
 
The challenge is clearly to define a suitable danger signal, a choice that 
might prove as critical as the choice of fitness function for an evolutionary 
algorithm. In addition, the physical distance in the biological system should 
be translated into a suitable proxy measure for similarity or causality in 
Artificial Immune Systems. This process is not likely to be trivial. 
Nevertheless, if these challenges are met, then future Artificial Immune 
Systems applications might derive considerable benefit, and new insights, 
from the Danger Theory, in particular Intrusion Detection Systems. 
 
7. SOME PROMISING AREAS FOR FUTURE 
APPLICATION 
It seems intuitively obvious, that Artificial Immune Systems should be 
most suitable for computer security problems. If the human immune system 
keeps our body alive and well, why can we not do the same for computers 
using Artificial Immune Systems? 
 
Earlier, we have outlined the traditional approach to do this: However, in 
order to provide viable Intrusion Detection Systems, Artificial Immune 
Systems must build a set of detectors that accurately match antigens. In 
current Artificial Immune Systems based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(Dasgupta and Gonzalez (2002), Esponda et al (2002), Hofmeyr and Forrest 
(2000)), both network connections and detectors are modelled as strings. 
Detectors are randomly created and then undergo a maturation phase where 
they are presented with good, i.e. self, connections. If the detectors match 
any of these they are eliminated otherwise they become mature. These 
mature detectors start to monitor new connections during their lifetime. If 
these mature detectors match anything else, exceeding a certain threshold 
value, they become activated. This is then reported to a human operator who 
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decides whether there is a true anomaly. If so, the detectors are promoted to 
memory detectors with an indefinite life span and minimum activation 
threshold (immunisation) (Kim and Bentley 2002). 
 
An approach such as the above is known as negative selection as only 
those detectors (antibodies) that do not match live on (Forrest et al. 1994). 
Earlier versions of negative selection algorithm used binary representation 
scheme, however, this scheme shows scaling problems when it is applied to 
real network traffic (Kim and Bentley 2001). As the systems to be protected 
grow larger and larger so does self and nonself. Hence, it becomes more and 
more problematic to find a set of detectors that provides adequate coverage, 
whilst being computationally efficient. It is inefficient, to map the entire self 
or nonself universe, particularly as they will be changing over time and only 
a minority of nonself is harmful, whilst some self might cause damage (e.g. 
internal attack). This situation is further aggravated by the fact that the labels 
self and nonself are often ambiguous and even with expert knowledge they 
are not always applied correctly (Kim and Bentley 2002). 
 
How could this problem be overcome? One way could be to borrowed 
ideas from the Danger Theory to provide a way of grounding the response 
and hence removing the necessity to map self or nonself. In our system, the 
correlation of low-level alerts (danger signals) will trigger a reaction. An 
important and recent research issue for Intrusion Detection Systems is how 
to find true intrusion alerts from thousands and thousands of false alerts 
generated (Hofmeyr and Forrest 2000). Existing Intrusion Detection Systems 
employ various types of sensors that monitor low-level system events. Those 
sensors report anomalies of network traffic patterns, unusual terminations of 
UNIX processes, memory usages, the attempts to access unauthorised files, 
etc. (Kim and Bentley 2001). Although these reports are useful signals of 
real intrusions, they are often mixed with false alerts and their unmanageable 
volume forces a security officer to ignore most alerts (Hoagland and 
Staniford 2002). Moreover, the low level of alerts makes it very hard for a 
security officer to identify advancing intrusions that usually consist of 
different stages of attack sequences. For instance, it is well known that 
computer hackers use a number of preparatory stages (rArtificial Immune 
Systemsing low-level alerts) before actual hacking according to 
Hoaglandand and Staniford. Hence, the correlations between intrusion alerts 
from different attack stages provide more convincing attack scenarios than 
detecting an intrusion scenario based on low-level alerts from individual 
stages. Furthermore, such scenarios allow the Intrusion Detection Systems to 
detect intrusions early before damage becomes serious. 
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To correlate Intrusion Detection Systems alerts for detection of an 
intrusion scenario, recent studies have employed two different approaches: a 
probabilistic approach (Valdes and Skinner (2001)) and an expert system 
approach (Ning et al (2002)). The probabilistic approach represents known 
intrusion scenarios as Bayesian networks. The nodes of Bayesian networks 
are Intrusion Detection Systems alerts and the posterior likelihood between 
nodes is updated as new alerts are collected. The updated likelihood can lead 
to conclusions about a specific intrusion scenario occurring or not. The 
expert system approach initially builds possible intrusion scenarios by 
identifying low-level alerts. These alerts consist of prerequisites and 
consequences, and they are represented as hypergraphs. Known intrusion 
scenarios are detected by observing the low-level alerts at each stage, but 
these approaches have the following problems according to Cuppens et al 
(2002): 
 
• Handling unobserved low-level alerts that comprise an intrusion 
scenario. 
• Handling optional prerequisite actions. 
• Handling intrusion scenario variations. 
 
The common trait of these problems is that the Intrusion Detection 
Systems can fail to detect an intrusion when an incomplete set of alerts 
comprising an intrusion scenario is reported. In handling this problem, the 
probabilistic approach is somewhat more advantageous than the expert 
system approach because in theory it allows the Intrusion Detection Systems 
to correlate missing or mutated alerts. The current probabilistic approach 
builds Bayesian networks based on the similarities between selected alert 
features. However, these similarities alone can fail to identify a causal 
relationship between prerequisite actions and actual attacks if pairs of 
prerequisite actions and actual attacks do not appear frequently enough to be 
reported. Attackers often do not repeat the same actions in order to disguise 
their attempts. Thus, the current probabilistic approach fails to detect 
intrusions that do not show strong similarities between alert features but 
have causal relationships leading to final attacks. This limit means that such 
Intrusion Detection Systems fail to detect sophisticated intrusion scenarios. 
 
We propose Artificial Immune Systems based on Danger Theory ideas 
that can handle the above Intrusion Detection Systems alert correlation 
problems. The Danger Theory explains the immune response of the human 
body by the interaction between Antigen Presenting Cells and various 
signals. The immune response of each Antigen Presenting Cell is determined 
by the generation of danger signals through cellular stress or cell death. In 
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particular, the balance and correlation between different danger signals 
depending on different-cell death causes would appear to be critical to the 
immunological outcome. The investigation of this hypothesis is the main 
research goal of the immunologists for this project. The wet experiments of 
this project focus on understanding how the Antigen Presenting Cells react 
to the balance of different types of signals, and how this reaction leads to an 
overall immune response. Similarly, our Intrusion Detection Systems 
investigation will centre on understanding how intrusion scenarios would be 
detected by reacting to the balance of various types of alerts. In the Human 
Immune System, Antigen Presenting Cells activate according to the balance 
of apoptotic and necrotic cells and this activation leads to protective immune 
responses. Similarly, the sensors in Intrusion Detection Systems report 
various low-level alerts and the correlation of these alerts will lead to the 
construction of an intrusion scenario. 
8. TRICKS OF THE TRADE 
Are Artificial Immune Systems suitable for pure optimisation? 
Depending on what is meant by optimisation, the answer is probably no, 
in the same sense as ‘pure’ genetic algorithms are not ‘function optimizers’. 
One has to keep in mind that although the immune system is about matching 
and survival, it is really a team effort where multiple solutions are produced 
all the time that together provide the answer. Hence, in our opinion Artificial 
Immune Systems is probably more suited as an optimiser where multiple 
solutions are of benefit, either directly, e.g. because the problem has multiple 
objectives or indirectly, e.g. when a neighbourhood of solution sis produced 
that is then used to generate the desired outcome. However, Artificial 
Immune Systems can be made into more focused optimisers by adding hill-
climbing or other functions that exploit local or problem specific knowledge, 
similar to the idea of augmenting genetic algorithm to memetic algorithms. 
 
What problems are Artificial Immune Systems most suitable for? 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, we believe that although using 
Artificial Immune Systems for pure optimisation, e.g. the Travelling 
Salesman Problem or Job Shop Scheduling, can be made to work, this is 
probably missing the point. Artificial Immune Systems are powerful when a 
population of solution is essential either during the search or as an outcome. 
Furthermore, the problem has to have some concept of ‘matching’. Finally, 
because at their heart Artificial Immune Systems are evolutionary 
algorithms, they are more suitable for problems that change over time rather 
and need to be solved again and again, rather than one-off optimisations. 
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Hence, the evidence seems to point to Data Mining in its wider meaning as 
the best area for Artificial Immune Systems. 
 
How do I set the parameters? 
Unfortunately, there is no short answer to this question. As with the 
majority of other heuristics that require parameters to operate, their setting is 
individual to the problem solved and universal values are not available. 
However, it is fair to say that along with other evolutionary algorithms 
Artificial Immune Systems are robust with respect to parameter values as 
long as they are chosen from a sensible range. 
 
Why not use a Genetic Algorithm instead? 
Because you may miss out on the benefits of the idiotypic network 
effects. 
 
Why not use a Neural Network instead? 
Because you may miss out on the benefits of a population of solutions 
and the evolutionary selection pressure and mutation. 
 
Are Artificial Immune Systems Learning Classifier Systems under a 
different name? 
No, not quite. However, to our knowledge Learning Classifier Systems 
are probably the most similar of the better known meta-heuristic, as they 
also combine some features of Evolutionary Algorithms and Neural 
Networks. However, these features are different. Someone who is interested 
in implementing and Artificial Immune Systems or Learning Classifier 
Systems is likely to be well advised to read about both approaches to see 
which one is most suited for the problem at hand. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The immune system is highly distributed, highly adaptive, self-
organising in nature, maintains a memory of past encounters, and has the 
ability to continually learn about new encounters. The Artificial Immune 
Systems is an example of a system developed around the current 
understanding of the immune system. It illustrates how an Artificial Immune 
Systems can capture the basic elements of the immune system and exhibit 
some of its chief characteristics. 
 
Artificial Immune Systems can incorporate many properties of natural 
immune systems, including diversity, distributed computation, error 
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tolerance, dynamic learning and adaptation and self-monitoring. The human 
immune system has motivated scientists and engineers for finding powerful 
information processing algorithms that has solved complex engineering 
tasks. The Artificial Immune Systems is a general framework for a 
distributed adaptive system and could, in principle, be applied to many 
domains. Artificial Immune Systems can be applied to classification 
problems, optimisation tasks and other domains. Like many biologically 
inspired systems it is adaptive, distributed and autonomous. The primary 
advantages of the Artificial Immune Systems are that it only requires 
positive examples, and the patterns it has learnt can be explicitly examined. 
In addition, because it is self-organizing, it does not require effort to 
optimize any system parameters. 
 
To us, the attraction of the immune system is that if an adaptive pool of 
antibodies can produce 'intelligent' behaviour, can we harness the power of 
this computation to tackle the problem of preference matching, 
recommendation and intrusion detection? Our conjecture is that if the 
concentrations of those antibodies that provide a better match are allowed to 
increase over time, we should end up with a subset of good matches. 
However, we are not interested in optimising, i.e. in finding the one best 
match. Instead, we require a set of antibodies that are a close match but 
which are at the same time distinct from each other for successful 
recommendation. This is where we propose to harness the idiotypic effects 
of binding antibodies to similar antibodies to encourage diversity. 
 
10. SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 
The following websites, books and proceedings should be an excellent 
starting point for those readers wishing to learn more about Artificial 
Immune Systems. 
 
• Artificial Immune Systems and Their Applications by D Dasgupta 
(Editor), Springer Verlag, 1999. 
• Artificial Immune Systems: A New Computational Intelligence 
Approach by L de Castro, J Timmis, Springer Verlag, 2002. 
• Immunocomputing: Principles and Applications by A Tarakanov et al, 
Springer Verlag, 2003. 
• Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Immune 
Systems (ICARIS), Springer Verlag, 2003. 
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• Artificial Immune Systems Forum Webpage: http://www.artificial-
immune-systems.org/artist.htm 
• Artificial Immune Systems Bibliography: http://issrl.cs.memphis.edu/ 
Artificial Immune Systems/Artificial Immune Systems_bibliography.pdf 
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